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In this chapter, we will:
I See how people make choices between consumption, leisure
and household production
I Understand how the labor supply curve results from the
combination of substitution effects and income effects
I Learn what the wage elasticities of labor supply are
I Explore when and why people decide to retire
I Learn the principles guiding the econometrics of labor supply
and the main empirical results
I Provide an overview of the results of macro- and
micro-empirical studies on labor supply elasticities
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Introduction
I Since 1900, in the United States, many changes in worked
hours led to a significant increase in the labor force
I As an individual disposes a limited amount of time, (s)he has
to choose to allocate between paid work and leisure
I Wage constitutes an important factor in the choice
I Labor supply depends on trade-offs within family because it is
the counterpart of the “household production”
I A better understanding of labor supply behaviors allows to
understand the consequences of the tax system
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Facts about labor supply (1) - Basic definitions
I The labor force is composed of all persons employed or
looking for a job
I To be considered unemployed, people must:
I Be without work
I Be available for work
I Be seeking for work
I The participation rate is the ratio of the labor force to the
population in age of working (generally more than 15 years
old)
I The employment rate is the ratio of the number of employed
people to the working age-population
I The unemployment rate is the ratio of the number of
unemployed people to the labor force
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Facts about labor supply (2) - The trend in the amount of
time worked
Amount of time worked
1870 1913 1938 1997 2011
Germany 2941 2584 2316 1507 1413
United States 2964 2605 2062 1850 1787
France 2945 2588 1848 1603 1476
United Kingdom 2984 2624 2267 1731 1625
Sweden 2945 2588 2204 1629 1644
Wages
Germany 100 185 285 1505 1602
United States 100 189 325 586 603
France 100 205 335 1579 1890
United Kingdom 100 157 256 708 871
Sweden 100 270 521 1601 2011
Table 1: Hours worked annually per person and real hourly wages in the
manufacturing sector. Source: Maddison (1995) for 1870, 1913, 1938
and OECD data for 1997 and 2011.
7 / 81
Facts about labor supply (3) - The trend in the amount of
time worked
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Facts about labor supply (4) - The trend in the amount of
time worked
I Table 1 shows that labor productivity grows since the 1870s
I In fact, before the agricultural and industrial revolution,
productivity had varied very little for several centuries
I Figure 1.1 shows the variation of the annual amount of time
worked in different countries
I However, these global trends in time worked are difficult to
interpret because it depends on many factors
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Facts about labor supply (5) - The evolution of
participation rates
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Facts about labor supply (6) - The evolution of
participation rates
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Facts about labor supply (7) - The evolution of
participation rates
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Facts about labor supply (8) - The evolution of
participation rates
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Facts about labor supply (8 bis) - The evolution of
participation rates
Single Married
1900 45.9 5.6
1950 53.6 21.6
1988 67.7 56.7
2000 68.9 61.1
2010 63.3 61.0
Table 2: Civilian labor force participation rates of women aged 16 and
over, classified by their marital status, in the United States.
Source: Ehrenberg and Smith (1994, Table 6.1, p. 165) for 1900, 1950 and 1988, and
Census Bureau for 2010.
14 / 81
Facts about labor supply (9) - Part-time work by women
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Facts about labor supply (10) - Leisure and home
production
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Facts about labor supply (11) - Leisure and home
production
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Facts about labor supply (12) - Leisure and home
production
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The choice between consumption and leisure (1) - The
basic model
Preferences
I The trade-off between consumption and leisure is based upon
the utility function of each individual
I U(C , L) denotes the individual’s utility function, where C and
L designate the consumption of goods and that of leisure
I L0 designates the total amount of time that an individual
disposes
I h = L0 − L is the length of time worked
I The set of consumption and leisure by which the consumer
obtains a given level of utility U, is called an indifference
curve. It is described in figure 1.10
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The choice between consumption and leisure (2) - The
basic model
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The choice between consumption and leisure (3) - The
basic model
The indifference curves satisfy some properties:
I Each indifference curve corresponds to a higher level of utility,
the farther out the curve is from the origin
I Indifference curves do not intersect
I The indifference curves are negatively sloped
I The slope defines The marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure
I It represents the quantity of goods that a consumer must
renounce in exchange for an hour of supplementary leisure for
her level of satisfaction to remain unchanged
I The marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure diminishes with leisure time
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The choice between consumption and leisure (4) - The
basic model
Choices
I The budget constraint of an agent is:
C + wL ≤ R0 ≡ wL0 + R
I w is the real hourly wage
I wh = w(L0 − L) represents total income
I R is the income that an individual may acquire outside the
labor market
I Thus the problem of the consumer becomes:
max
{C ,L}
U(C , L) subject to the budget constraint C +wL ≤ R0
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The choice between consumption and leisure (5) - The
basic model
The interior solutions
I Utilizing the Lagrangian and calculating the FOCs, the
solution is:
UL(C
∗, L∗)
UC (C ∗, L∗)
= w and C ∗ + wL∗ = R0 (2)
I Figure 1.11 shows an example of a possible solution
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The choice between consumption and leisure (6) - The
basic model
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The choice between consumption and leisure (7) - The
basic model
The reservation wage
I The marginal rate of substitution at point A is called the
reservation wage, which is defined by:
wA =
UL(R, L0)
UC (R, L0)
I The reservation wage depends on the form of the function U
and on the level of non wage income R
I It determines the condition of participation in the labor market
I If the current wage falls below the reservation wage, a worker
will not participate in the labor market
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The choice between consumption and leisure (8) - The
properties of labor supply
Substitution effect and income effect
I The properties of the supply of individual labor result from the
combination of a substitution effect and two income effects
I By definition,
I Leisure is a normal good if its demand rises with R0
I Leisure is an inferior good if its demand decreases with R0
I The consequence of an increase in non-earned income are
represented in figure 1.11 by the shift from point E to point E ′
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The choice between consumption and leisure (9) - The
properties of labor supply
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The choice between consumption and leisure (10) - The
properties of labor supply
I Figure 1.12 shows the change in consumer’s equilibrium when
the wage increases from w to wl
I From the initial equilibrium E , the substitution effect moves it
to E ′. The substitution effect thus implies a reduction of
leisure
I From the equilibrium E ′, the income effect shifts the
equilibrium to E ′′. Thus the substitution effect and the
income effect work to produce the same result
I If leisure is a normal good, when the wage increases the
substitution effect increases the labor supply while the income
effect decreases it
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The choice between consumption and leisure (11) - The
properties of labor supply
I The Hicksian or compensated elasticity is:
ηH =
w
hˆ
dhˆ
dw
I The Marshallian or non-compensated elasticity is:
ηM =
w
h∗
dh∗
dw
I These two elasticities are linked by the Slutsky equation:
ηM = ηH +
wh∗
R0
ηR0
I Where ηR0 represents the Marshallian elasticity of labor supply
with respect to potential income
I This equation shows that Marshallian elasticity is to be
interpreted as the sum of the substitution effect, represented
by the Hicksian elasticity, and the income effect
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The choice between consumption and leisure (12) - The
properties of labor supply
The shape of the labor supply curve
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The choice between consumption and leisure (13) - The
properties of labor supply
Extensive margin, Intensive margin, and aggregate labor supply
I The wage exerts two distinct effects on labor supply by
influencing
I The decision to work or not, called extensive margin
I The number of hours supplied by every person who does
decide to work, is called the intensive margin
I The supply of labor denoted h(w , R) is a decreasing function
of non-earned income
I We define R¯ by h(w , R¯) = 0, i.e only individuals whose
non-earned income is inferior to R¯ work
I We consider a large population in which individuals have
different non-earned income represented by the cdf Φ
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The choice between consumption and leisure (14) - The
properties of labor supply
I The aggregate labor supply is:
LA(w) =
∫ R¯
0
h(w , R)dΦ(R).
I The derivative of the aggregate labor supply with respect to
the wage w is:∫ R¯
0
∂h(w , R)
∂w
dΦ(R) + h(w , R¯)Φ′(R¯)
dR¯
dw
.
I The first term represents the changes in the intensive margin.
The second term represents the changes in the extensive
margin
I As h(w , R¯) = 0, it means that small variations in wages have
an impact on the aggregate supply of labor felt solely through
changes at the intensive margin
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Labor supply with household production and within the
family (1) - Household production
The consumer’s program
I Goods consumed may be purchased, in quantity CM , or
produced domestically, in quantity CD , with C = CD + CM
I We will denote:
I L0 the total endowment of time available
I hD the paid working time, hM household working time
I CD = f (hD) the domestic production function
I L = L0 − hD − hM
I The optimal solutions of consumption and leisure are:
UL(C
∗, L∗)
UC (C ∗, L∗)
= w = f ′(h∗D) and C
∗ + wL∗ = R˜0 (7)
I With the potential income, R˜0 = R0 + f (h
∗
D)− wh∗D
I The agent thus has an interest in devoting his working time to
household activities to the extent that the marginal
productivity of an hour of this type of work is superior to an
hour’s wage
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Labor supply with household production and within the
family (2) - Household production
Elasticity of labor supply
I The system of equations (7) allows us to write the optimal
demand for leisure in the form L∗ = Λ(w , R˜0). Differentiating
this equality with respect to w , we get:
dL∗
dw
= Λ1 +Λ2
dR˜0
dw
with
dR˜0
dw
= L0 − h∗D
I As f ′(h∗D) = w implies that dh
∗
D/dw = 1/f
′′(h∗D), the
identity h∗M = L0 − h∗D − L∗ entails:
dh∗M
dw
= −(Λ1 +Λ2L0) +
[
Λ2h∗D −
1
f ”(h∗D)
]
I The term −(Λ1 +Λ2L0) represents the impact of a variation
in the wage on the supply of wage labor for a given amount of
household activity
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Labor supply with household production and within the
family (3) - Intrafamilial decisions
The family has considerable influence on the behavior of its
members. The analysis of family choices has been developed along
two different lines:
I The unitary approach considers a family composed of two
persons whose preferences are presented by U(C , L1, L2)
I This representation reveals that the unitary representation of
the household implies that the distribution of non-earned
incomes has no importance
I This is known as income pooling which signifies that it is not
necessary to know which member of the couple is the
beneficiary of transfer income
I However, this last consequence is questionable
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Labor supply with household production and within the
family (4) - Intrafamilial decisions
The collective model
I This model starts from the principle that household choices
must arise out of individual preferences
I From the empirical point of view, the collective model has the
advantage of not adopting the hypothesis of “income pooling”
I Chiappori (1992) shows that this formulation of the
decision-making process within a household allows us to
deduct individual consumption, using the individual supplies of
labor and the total consumption of the household, which are
observable entities
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Labor supply with household production and within the
family (5) - Intrafamilial decisions
The added worker effect
I Models of intrafamilial choice throw a revealing light on
decisions to participate in the labor market
I The members’ choices are interdependent, and an individual’s
fluctuations in income will affect not only her own income but
also that of her family members
I In principle, a fall in wages may entail an increase in the labor
force by spurring additional workers to enter the market
I From the empirical point of view, this added worker effect
seems to be small
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Life cycle and retirement (1) - Intertemporal labor supply
I The dynamic theory of labor supply gives a central role to the
possibility of substituting for consumption and leisure over
time
A dynamic model of labor supply
I Consumer makes his choice over a “life cycle”
I We assume that the utility function is temporally separable.
Hence, it is written:
t=T
∑
t=0
U(Ct , Lt , t)
I The influence of past consumption on the utility of the
current period is neglected
I Besides, training increases the human capital and raises the
wage-earning prospects, so there must be trade-offs among
leisure, working time and time dedicated to training
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Life cycle and retirement (2) - Intertemporal labor supply
I In this model, we assume the opportunity to save, with rt the
real interest rate
I The evolution of the assets of the consumer is described by:
At = (1+ rt)At−1 + Bt + wt(1− Lt)− Ct (9)
I At designates the consumer’s assets
I Bt designates his income apart from wages
I This equation signifies, at each period t
I The increase in wealth is due to income from wage labor,
wt(1− Lt), to income rtAt−1 from savings, and to other
income Bt
I Consumption Ct for the period has to be deducted from these
gains
I The non-earned income Rt for the period t is equal to
Bt + rtAt−1
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Life cycle and retirement (3) - Intertemporal labor supply
Optimal solutions and demands in Frisch’s sense
I The consumer attempts to maximize his intertemporal utility
subject to the budget constraint (9). The FOCs are:
UC (Ct , Lt , t) = νt and UL(Ct , Lt , t) = νtwt
νt = (1+ rt+1)νt+1
I Limiting ourselves to interior solutions, the optimal
consumption and leisure are implicitly written as:
Ct = C (wt , νt , t) and Lt = L(wt , νt , t)
I This equation shows that the supply of labor at date t
depends on the current wage and the multiplier νt , which is
the marginal utility of wealth
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Life cycle and retirement (4) - Intertemporal labor supply
I According to the FOCs, successive iterations of the logarithms
of equation of νt entail:
ln νt = −
τ=t
∑
τ=1
ln(1+ rτ) + ln ν0
I A priori, the value of ν0 depends on all the wages received by
an individual during his lifetime
I This model shows that it is useful to distinguish the impact of
temporary variations in the wage from the impact of
permanent wage variations
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Life cycle and retirement (5) - Intertemporal labor supply
Frischian, Hicksian, and Marshallian Elasticities of labor supply
I The Frischian elasticity represents the impact of a
modification of the wage at date t on the supply of labor on
the same date, assuming that the marginal utility of wealth
remains constant
I It is useful to measure the impact of a transitory wage
variation, which has a negligible impact on wealth
I Marshallian elasticity measures the total impact of a wage
variation on labor supply, taking into account variability in the
marginal utility of wealth
I Hicksian elasticity measures the variation in labor supply, on
the assumption that the level of intertemporal utility remains
constant
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Life cycle and retirement (6) - Intertemporal labor supply
I The relation between the Marshallian, ηM , and Frischian, ηF ,
elasticities is:
ηM = ηF +
wh
Ω
ηΩ(1− γηΩ) (14)
I h and w represent respectively the labor supply and the wage
for the current period
I Ω represents present intertemporal wealth
I γ = −VΩΩVΩΩ , where V designates the indirect intertemporal
utility function. Parameter γ corresponds to the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, equal to the inverse of Arrow-Pratt
risk aversion
I The relation (14) shows that the impact of a wage variation
may be broken down into an intertemporal substitution effect,
measured by Frischian elasticity, and a wealth effect
represented by the other term
I One has ηF ≥ ηH ≥ ηM . In the absence of income effect, the
three elasticities are identical
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Life cycle and retirement (7) - Intertemporal labor supply
Transitory wage changes versus permanent wage changes
I We suppose that:
I The real interest rate, r , is constant
I The consumer is receiving no exogenous income
I Her instantaneous utility is:
U(Ct , Lt , t) = (1+ ρ)−t
(
ln Ct +
η
η−1 L
η−1
η
t
)
η > 1, ρ ≥ 0
I The Frischian demand functions are given by:
Lt =
[
1
ν0wt
(
1+ r
1+ ρ
)t]η
and Ct =
1
ν0
(
1+ r
1+ ρ
)t
I The intertemporal budget constraint of the consumer is:
T
∑
t=1
(1+ r)−t (Ct + wtLt) =
T
∑
t=1
(1+ r)−twt
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Life cycle and retirement (8) - Intertemporal labor supply
I The value of ν0 is defined as:
T
∑
t=1
(1+ ρ)−t
1+
[(
1+ r
1+ ρ
)−t
ν0wt
]1−η
−
(
1+ r
1+ ρ
)−t
ν0wt

= 0
I The multiplier ν0 is affected very little by changes in a
particular wage (transitory shock). On the other hand, it is
affected by a change that affects all wages: what we have then
is a modification of the wage profile, or a permanent shock
I A permanent shock (all wage are multiplied by the same
scalar) has no impact on labor supply because the income
effect and the substitution effect cancel out each other
I Agents adjust their supply of labor in response to temporary
changes in wage
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Life cycle and retirement (9) - Economic analysis of the
decision to retire
Social security and private pensions
I Most countries in the OECD have put in place pension
systems, public and private, enabling workers to receive
income when they retire from the labor market
I Every individual has the opportunity to supplement the public
retirement payout with private pensions, contributions to
which are negotiated between employer and employee at the
moment the labor contract is signed
I The system of public and private pensions creates incentives
for workers to take their retirement earlier or later
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Life cycle and retirement (10)
47 / 81
Life cycle and retirement (11) - Economic analysis of the
decision to retire
Option value in the life-cycle model
I We consider a person employed on date τ who decides to
retire on date s ≥ τ
I We suppose that the agent does not work at all after date s
I Let us denote:
I Vτ(s) the welfare of the consumer when he decides to retire at
date s
I Tm the legal age of retirement
I The agent chooses his retirement date, denoted s∗, by solving:
max
s
Vτ(s) subject to constraint Tm ≥ s ≥ τ
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Life cycle and retirement (12) - Economic analysis of the
decision to retire
I This way of estimating the process of ending one’s working
life leads us to examine the option value attached to the
decision not to take retirement right now
I Supposing that the decision is irreversible, if s∗ = τ, the
agent stops working immediately
I If s∗ > τ the agent continues to work and reconsiders his
decision at age (τ + 1)
I The option value of not retiring today is thus equal to
Vτ(s∗)− Vτ(τ)
I The agent continues to work if the option value is positive
and retires if it is negative
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Life cycle and retirement (13) - Economic analysis of the
decision to retire
The impact of eligibility rules
I Gustman et al. (1994) show that individuals with the highest
pensions are those who retire soonest. Conversely, workers
under financial pressure to put off their retirement do in fact
extend their working lives
I It is possible that, for some reasons of efficiency, firms may
offer pension plans that privilege a sooner retirement. Such
firms therefore attract workers who have a strong inclination
to retire early
I To eliminate this endogenous bias, numerous studies analyze
the behavior of workers in the face of unanticipated changes
in their retirement conditions
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Life cycle and retirement (14) - Economic analysis of the
decision to retire
I Lumsdaine et al. (1990) studied the case of an American firm
where employees had the opportunity to retire early. They
found that the new arrangement more than tripled the rate of
leaving of the most advantaged workers
I The importance of financial incentives, direct or indirect, is
confirmed by most research
I Jones (2001) estimated that pushing the age of eligibility for
Medicare back from 65 to 67 years delays retirement by
around 27 days between 60 and 69 years of age
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Estimation of the structural parameters of labor supply
model (1)
I The main problem confronting empirical analysis of labor
supply is that the correlation between the pertinent financial
incentives and the number of hours worked does not
necessarily indicate a causal relation
I The method frequently adopted is to compare the behavior of
persons who belong to a “treated” group affected by an
exogenous change in their income with the behavior of other
persons belonging to a “control” group who are unaffected by
the same change
I A first approach is to evaluate the impact of the financial
incentive, without estimating the parameters of a theoretical
model (see chapter 12)
I The second one is to estimate the parameters of a theoretical
model, especially the different elasticities of Frisch, Marshall,
and Hicks, so as to be able to extrapolate the obtained results
to other situations
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Estimation of the structural parameters of labor supply
model (2) - Elasticities
The basic equation and the specification of control variables
I The basic equation of empirical models of labor supply relates
hours ht worked by a given individual at hourly wage wt at
each date t. It generally takes the form of a double-log-linear
relation:
ln ht = αw ln wt + αRRt + xtθ+ εt (20)
I Rt is a measure of income other than the current wage
I xt is a vector of dimension (1, n) describing the n individual
characteristics
I θ is a vector of dimension (n, 1) comprising n parameters to be
estimated
I αw and αR are also parameters to be estimated
I εt designates a random term reflecting individual heterogeneity
that is not observed
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Estimation of the structural parameters of labor supply
model (3) - Elasticities
Estimating Frischian Elasticity
I Substituting ln ν0 + ρt for R in equation (20) and taking this
equation in first-differences gives:
∆ ln ht = ρ+ αw∆ ln wt + ∆xtθ+ ∆εt
I This equation allows us to estimate the impact of a transitory
change in the wage
I It does not allow us to evaluate the impact of a change in the
overall wage profile, because this change causes the marginal
utility of wealth to vary
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Estimation of the structural parameters of labor supply
model (4) - Elasticities
Estimating Hicksian and Marshallian elasticities
I We have seen that the optimality of labor supply always
implies equality between the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure and the current wage at
each date
I This property suggests a two-stage resolution of the
consumer’s program
1. In the first stage, the agent maximizes her utility at date t
subject to the static budget constraint Ct = Rt + wtht , where
Rt = (1+ rt)At−1 + Bt − At
2. In the second stage, the consumer selects the optimal path for
her assets At
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Estimation of the structural parameters of labor supply
model (5) - Elasticities
I At the conclusion of the first stage, the consumer attains a
level of indirect utility V (Rt , t)
I In the second phase, she selects the optimal path for her
assets At by solving the program:
max
{At}
T
∑
t=0
V (Rt , t) subject to Rt = (1+ rt)At−1 + Bt − At
I Substituting Rt = Ct − wtht in equation (20) gives
ln ht = αw ln wt + αR(Ct − wtht) + xtθ+ εt
I We can estimate the Marshallian elasticity, αw = ∂lnh/∂lnw ,
and the Hicksian elasticity ηH = αw − αRwh
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Estimation of the structural parameters of labor supply
model (6) - An instructive example of a
life-cycle-consistent approach
I The method of ordinary least squares (OLS) is a flawed
method
I The endogeneity of wages is an issue: unobserved confounding
variables can influence the hours of work and wages
I The same problem applies to the relationship between hours
and non-earned income
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Estimation of the structural parameters of labor supply
model (7) - An instructive example of a
life-cycle-consistent approach
I Another approach consists in finding situations with
exogenous changes in incomes
I Blundell et al. (1998) applied the life-cycle-consistent
approach to married women in the United Kingdom during a
period when the tax rates fell
I The fact that some working individuals have been exempt
from any direct impact of these reforms due to the progressive
nature of the tax system yields the opportunity to construct a
suitable control group
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Estimation of the structural parameters of labor supply
model (8) - An instructive example of a
life-cycle-consistent approach
I The basic idea of Blundell et al. (1998) is to net out the
endogenous changes from wage variations
I The authors first group the individual data by cohort and
education
I They construct group means of hours and wages
I Separately, they calculate the means for each group over all
periods and the means for each period over all groups
I Then they subtract these groups and period means from the
group means calculated in each period
I After this operation, unobserved time-invariant group factors
that could influence wage levels and that could also be related
to hour levels are eliminated
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Estimation of the structural parameters of labor supply
model (9) - An instructive example of a
life-cycle-consistent approach
Estimation of the structural parameter with
difference-in-differences
I We consider the basic semi-log equation which leaves aside
non-earned income for notational simplicity:
hit = α+ αw ln wit + ε it
I We imagine that tax reform implemented at date t affected
the treated group and the control group differently and that
the effect of the treatment transits through net wages
I We assume that in the absence of the policy change, the
means of hours would have evolved in the same way over time
in both groups:
E [ε it |g , t] = ηg +mt for all g and t (A1)
I ηg is a time-invariant group effect and mt a period effect
common to all groups
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Estimation of the structural parameters of labor supply
model (10) - An instructive example of a
life-cycle-consistent approach
I Assumption (A1) is known as the common trend assumption
I It assumes that the difference in average labor supply across
groups, given the observables, remains unchanged over time
I This assumption is a key identifying assumption, which means
that unobserved factors can vary across groups or over time
for all groups but cannot vary differently with groups
I Using this assumption, and denoting by ∆ the first difference
operator, we get:
∆E [hit |T , t] = αw∆E ln [wit |T , t] + ∆mt
∆E [hit |C , t] = αw∆E ln [wit |C , t] + ∆mt
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Estimation of the structural parameters of labor supply
model (11) - An instructive example of a
life-cycle-consistent approach
I Assuming that the average change in after-tax wages before
and after the reform is different for the treatment group and
the control group, the coefficient αw is given by:
αw =
∆E[hit |T , t]− ∆E[hit |C , t]
∆E[ln wit |T , t]− ∆E[ln wit |C , t]
I In this case, the difference-in-differences estimator α̂w , which
measures the causal effect of the policy change on hours
worked before and hours worked after the introduction of the
new policy on those affected by this change compared to
those who do not, is
α̂w =
∆hTt − ∆hCt
∆ln wTt − ∆ln wCt
I An advantage of this estimator is that it deals with
measurement errors 63 / 81
Estimation of the Structural parameters of labor supply
model (12) - An instructive example of a
life-cycle-consistent approach
αw αR Uncompensated Compensated Other Group means:
wage wage Income Hours Wage Income
No children 4.493 0.000 0.140 0.140 0.000 32 2.97 88.63
Youngest child 0-2 4.105 -0.028 0.205 0.301 -0.185 20 3.36 129.69
Youngest child 3-4 6.686 -0.022 0.371 0.439 -0.173 18 3.10 143.64
Youngest child 5-10 2.777 -0.014 0.132 0.173 -0.102 21 2.86 151.13
Youngest child 11+ 3.260 -0.011 0.130 0.160 -0.063 25 2.83 147.31
Table 3: Elasticities for married women in the U.K. using education and
age cohorts as grouping instruments.
Source: Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) p.846 and p.848.
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Main results in the literature (1) - Form of labor supply
I The study of Blundell et al. (1992) suggests that an
individual’s labor supply takes the form of a hump-shaped
curve
I They used data from the expenditures of British families,
focusing on the single mothers and differentiating those who
have non-earned income greater than the median of the
sample and those who have not. The results are presented in
figure 1.16
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Main results in the literature (2) - Form of labor supply
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Main results in the literature (3) - Extensive and intensive
margin elasticities
I Many studies found that extensive-margin labor supply
elasticity is larger than intensive-margin labor supply elasticity
I Two reasons explain this result: indivisible labor supply and
optimization frictions
Indivisible labor supply
I In this case, changes in tax or wage rates are compatible with
large extensive-margin responses, even if they have little effect
on hours conditional on employment
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Main results in the literature (4) - Extensive and intensive
margin elasticities
Optimization frictions
I This may arise from organizational constraints internal to the
firm, which make the adjustment of hours costly, or create the
cost of finding another job better adapted to the worker’s
desired timetable
I Such adjustment costs may lead to underestimate the
elasticity of labor supply at the intensive margin
I To show it, we take the basic model and assume that working
entails a fixed cost F
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Main results in the literature (5) - Extensive and intensive
margin elasticities
I An individual who works attains a level of utility:
U [w(L0 − L) + R − F , L]
I The optimal duration of leisure, L(w) verifies the FOC,
UL − wUC = 0
I The gain from adjusting hours when the wage goes from w to
w1 is:
GI =U [w1(L0 − L(w1)) + R − F , L(w1)]
− U [w1(L0 − L(w)) + R − F , L(w)]
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Main results in the literature (6) - Extensive and intensive
margin elasticities
I The approximation of this gain by a first-order Taylor
expansion around point [w1(L0 − L(w1)) + R − F , L(w1)]
gives:
GI = [L(w1)− L(w)]
×
[
UL [w1(L0 − L(w1)) + R − F , L(w1)]
− w1UC [w1(L0 − L(w1)) + R − F , L(w1)]
]
I Considering this approximation, Figure 1.17 shows that a
wage increase from level w to w1 induces a shift from point A
to point B if the duration of work remains unchanged at its
initial level
I The utility increases and the gain corresponds to a shift from
the point B to C
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Main results in the literature (7) - Extensive and intensive
margin elasticities
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Main results in the literature (8) - Extensive and intensive
margin elasticities
I In contrast to the adjustment at the intensive margin, the
gains from adjusting hours at the extensive margin are not null
I Assuming that the individual has an interest in not working at
wage w but has an interest in working at wage w1 > w , the
gain from the shift from non-work to work is given by:
GE = U [w1(L0 − L(w1)) + R − F , L(w1)]− U(R, L0)
I A first-order Taylor expansion around point
[w1(L0 − L(w1)) + R − F , L(w1)] gives:
GE ≈ FUC [w1(L0 − L(w1)) + R − F , L(w1)]
I Considering this approximation, Figure 1.18 shows that
I The gain from shifting from initial point A to C may be greater
than the second-order gain obtained by shifting from B to C
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Main results in the literature (9) - Extensive and intensive
margin elasticities
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Main results in the literature (10) - Micro and macro
elasticities
I Macro elasticity measures the elasticity of aggregate labor
supply at the country level. The “aggregate hours elasticity”
is equal to the sum of the extensive and intensive elasticities
I Chetty et al. (2011b) have summarized the micro and macro
evidence on the extensive and intensive margins in the
following table 4
I It shows that the structural micro and macro estimates of
Hicksian elasticities match on both margins. Thus, they are
consistent with the observed differences in aggregate hours
across countries with different tax systems
I But Frisch elasticities do not: estimates are small when based
on micro evidence but large when based on macro studies
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Main results in the literature (11) - Micro and macro
elasticities
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin Aggregate Hours
Steady State
(Hicksian) micro 0.33 0.26 0.59
Steady State
(Hicksian) macro 0.33 0.17 0.50
Intertemporal
Substitution (Frisch) micro 0.54 0.28 0.82
Intertemporal
Substitution (Frisch) macro [0.54] [2.30] 2.84
Table 4: Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities. Each cell shows a
point estimate of the relevant elasticity based on meta analyses of
existing micro and macro evidence.
Micro estimates are identified from quasi-experimental studies; macro estimates are
identified from cross-country variation in tax rates (steady state elasticities) and
business cycle fluctuations (intertemporal substitution elasticities). The aggregate
hours elasticity is the sum of the extensive and intensive elasticities. Macro studies do
not always decompose intertemporal aggregate hours elasticities into extensive and
intensive elasticities. Therefore, the estimates in brackets show the values implied by
the macro aggregate hours elasticity if the intensive Frisch elasticity is chosen to
match the micro estimate of 0.54.
Source : Chetty et al. (2011, Table 1, p. 2).
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Main results in the literature (12) - Micro and macro
elasticities
Theorists and empirical researchers are left with two possibilities:
either the micro estimates are based on models that overlook
important factors that could increase elasticities, or
macroeconomists of the business cycle do not have the right model
available, one that would describe economic fluctuations
consistently with observed agents’ behavior
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Main results in the literature (13) - The elasticity of labor
supply of men and women
I Labor supply elasticities for men are very small and
insignificant, whereas that of women are somewhat larger
I According to the theoretical models, these results indicate
that, within the household, fiscal reforms affect principally the
participation decisions of women, since they have lower wages
than those of men and in all likelihood possess a comparative
advantage when it comes to household production
I The difference between the elasticities of the labor supplied to
the market by men and by married women is explained by the
fact that women’s labor is regarded as more substitutable for
domestic work than that of men, especially when the woman
is less qualified than her spouse
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Main results in the literature (14) - The cost of leisure and
the productivity of home production
I In the basic models of labor supply, the cost of leisure is
measured as an opportunity cost, that is as forgone wages
I Gonzalez-Chapela (2007) obtains an intertemporal elasticity
of labor supply of 0.16 to the price of leisure goods and 0.25
to wages for working-age men
I This means, for a man working 2,000 hours per year, that a
fall of 1% in the price of leisure goods would prompt a fall of
3.2 hours in the length of time worked annually
I An exogenous source of variation, such as the weather, could
also derive changes in the utility:
I When the weather is good, the opportunity cost of working is
greater than it is on days when it rains. For the US, Connolly
(2008) finds that men reduce their investment in leisure time
by 30 minutes on rainy days so that they can work longer
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Main results in the literature (15) - Micro and macro
elasticities
I The impact of children on the working women is negative
I Bloom et al. (2009) estimate the effect of fertility on female
labor force participation
I They find that removing legal restrictions on abortion
significantly reduces fertility and that a birth reduces a
woman’s labor supply by almost 2 years
I The ability to control birth timing is also an important factor
that probably bolstered female participation
I The availability of child care is another possible factor that
may explain the female employment rate
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Summary and conclusion (1)
I According to the neo-classical theory of labor supply, every
individual trades off between consuming a good and
consuming leisure
I The supply of individual labor is positive if the current wage
exceeds the reservation wage
I If labor supply is positive, the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure is equal to the hourly wage
I The relation between the individual supply of labor and the
hourly wage is the result of combined substitution and income
effects
I The substitution effect implies an increasing relation between
the wage and labor supply, while the income effect works in
the opposite direction if leisure is a normal good
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Summary and conclusion (2)
I When an individual has the opportunity to devote a part of
her time to household production, at the optimum, the hourly
wage is equal to the marginal productivity of household work
I As a general rule, the mechanism of substitution of leisure
over time implies that the permanent component of the
evolution of real wages has a smaller effect on labor supply
than the transitory component
I The elasticity of labor supply by women is, in general, greater
than that of men, which is generally small, although this
difference diminishes over time
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